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Valorising the Virtual Citizen:
Death, Gender and Citizenship in Ireland
Patrick Hanafin
ABSTRACT
This piece advances a reading of postcolonial Irish citizenship which is
premised on a form of citizenship as self-sacrifice. Despite substantial political
victories for a liberal politics of citizenship in recent decades, there continues to
remain lodged within the national psyche traces of a societal formation which
privileges virtual citizens over fully realised ones, myth over history, and male
violence over female autonomy. The sacrificing self is urged in her role as
citizen to forego aspects of her individuality in the interests of the postcolonial
project of state formation. In particular I want to examine why over and over
again it was the body of woman which was the site of much of the symbolic and
actual violence in this sacrificial social contract. In the post-independence period
it was clear that women would have to repay the sacrifice of men with a
sacrifice of themselves to the idealised version of Irish citizenship espoused by
the postcolonial elite. The men died for mother Ireland and now mother Ireland
must earn her keep, as wife and mother.
         Johnny Boyle: I won’t go! Haven’t I done enough for
Ireland! I’ve lost me arm, an’ me hip’s
desthroyed so that I’ll never be able to
walk right agen! Good God, haven’t I
done enough for Ireland?
The Mobilizer: Boyle, no man can do enough for
Ireland!
(O’Casey, S; 1949, p. 60).
1. INTRODUCTION
In this piece I want to advance a reading of postcolonial Irish citizenship which
is premised on a form of citizenship as self-sacrifice. Despite substantial
political victories for a liberal politics of citizenship in recent decades, there
continues to remain lodged within the national psyche traces of a societal
formation which privileges virtual citizens over fully realised ones, myth over
history, and male violence over female autonomy. The sacrificing self is urged
in her role as citizen to forego aspects of her individuality in the interests of the
postcolonial project of state formation. In particular I want to examine why over
and over again it was the body of woman which was the site of much of the
symbolic and actual violence in this sacrificial social contract. In the post-
independence period it was clear that women would have to repay the sacrifice
of men with a sacrifice of themselves to the idealised version of Irish citizenship
espoused by the postcolonial elite.
The exultation of a symbolic woman was merely a mask which occluded
the mistreatment of real Irish women.1 This sado-masochistic tendency in Irish
society is to be found in the life and works of Patrick Pearse the revolutionary
most associated with the philosophy of blood sacrifice. Pearse wrote, ‘thrashing
women is one of the ways of loving’ (Cited in Valente, J; 1994, p. 207)2. This
statement from a practitioner of blood sacrifice did not augur well for the way in
which woman was to be constructed in the state which appeared in his wake.
Two recent political events provide evidence of the enduring nature of
this sacrificial economy. These events were the reburial amidst excessive media
publicity by the Irish Government in October 2001 of ten male nationalist
freedom fighters who were executed during the War of Independence (1919-
1921); and the Government’s attempt at dealing with the issue of abortion by
holding a referendum which, if passed, would have given further constitutional
protection to the foetus, and would have narrowed further the grounds for
legally sanctioned pregnancy termination. It seems to me that these events
exemplify the manner in which Irish political and legal discourse over questions
2of citizenship in the postcolonial period has privileged the virtual citizen who,
although inhabiting the dead zone of non-agency, wields great politico-symbolic
power. Such virtual citizens include the dead sons who in their sacrificial act led
to the country’s birth out of colonial oppression and the constitutionally
protected legal person of the foetus. This privileging of such virtual citizens
leads to a corresponding sacrificing of the female as a receptacle for national
reproduction. Thus, the attempt to overcome the reality of death has moved from
the anticolonial postulating of a deathless maternal love (death out of love for
Mother Ireland) to, in the postcolonial period, the vanquishing of a death-
bearing maternal body (See Kristeva, J; 1976, pp. 160-86).
2. VIRTUAL CITIZENS
The resurrection of dead bodies, both literal and metaphorical, has been an
enduring feature of Irish political discourse. Indeed the iconography of the dead
patriot is inserted in the Preamble to the Irish Constitution of 1937:
We, the people of Erie, humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine
Lord, Jesus Christ, who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial, gratefully
remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful
independence of our Nation.
In this constitutional rendering of the nation, the citizen-subject was to become a
martyr of the everyday, a body which following the example of the iconic
martyred figures of the anticolonial struggle and of the ur-sacrificial figure of
Christ was to derive redemption through suffering and denial. As the patriots of
1916 and of the War of Independence gave their lives so that Ireland as state
could emerge, the citizens of the new state found that their life was to be
sacrificed to the ideal of an authentic Irish citizenship, one founded on an ascetic
Roman Catholic construction of the individual as living for death. Thus, the
sacrificial symbolism of the colonial period was translated into the postcolonial
sacrificial social contract.
 This country where the dead hero lives on is also the home of another
virtual citizen. Indeed today it is the foetus which has become the exemplar of
virtual citizenship. In this regard I am adapting an allusion by Jean Baudrillard
(2001, p. 115) to the double sense of the adjective ‘virtuel’ in French, which also
has the sense of potential or possible. The foetus like the dead hero is the perfect
virtual citizen, carrying with it the promise of regeneration and perpetual life.
This valorising of life and the deflection of death has been inscribed in law in
the form of a constitutionally protected right to foetal life, which was inserted in
1983 as a result of a constitutional referendum. These virtual citizens in the
sense of their potential for citizenship and also in their potential to form a
community based on a philosophy of Life, are the iconic figures of
3
contemporary Irish citizenship, circulating in national discursive space as
potential points of suture for a nation in fragmentation. The valorisation of
potential life and the endless reproduction of society enacts the apotheosis of
what Lauren Berlant calls a ‘dead citizenship’ which marginalizes the living in
order to privilege the dead or the yet to be. In Berlant’s view dead citizenship is
a means of fixing or stabilising identity within a fantasy of homogeneous
nationhood. Dead citizenship:
involves a theory of national identity that equates identity with iconicity. It
requires that I tell you a secret history of acts that are not experienced as acts,
because they take place in the abstract idealised time and space of
citizenship… In the fantasy world of national culture, citizens aspire to dead
identities – constitutional personhood in its public-sphere abstraction and
supra-historicity, reproductive sexuality in the zone of privacy. Identities not
live, or in play, but dead, frozen, fixed, or at rest’ (Berlant, L; 1997, pp. 59-60).
One figure that was not to be sacrificed in the sacrificial economy was the
foetus, as this would rob the nation of future life, placing the nation in peril as
well as the foetus. Unlike dead male fighters the woman who seeks to terminate
her pregnancy interrupts the vitalist national narrative. The hero gives his life in
the name of the new nation. The woman acts selfishly in putting her wishes in
front of this potential life. She must fall within this altruistic model of
citizenship and give of herself so that the nation may be perpetually reproduced.
Thus, in the discourse of traditionalist groups Irishness is seen as coeval with
life and regeneration. Abortion threatens the master signifier Life. Thus, those
who practise such an act are constructed as outlaws and are denied the love of
the Symbolic Other (God, medical community, society) (Bracher, M; 1993).
3. LAW’S MASCULINE NATION
The honouring of the dead male patriot and the marginalisation of women in
political and legal discourse stems the patriarchal nationalism of late colonial
Ireland, where the male took an active role in the construction of the nation. In
order to confirm their masculinity such males required passive female
counterparts against which to construct this fantasy of the masculine nation. As
Elizabeth Butler Cullingford has pointed out:
The special place of woman in de Valera’s ‘theocratic Constitution of 1937’ is
a legacy of Pearse’s insistence that to confirm their ‘manliness’ Irishmen
needed ‘feminine’ counterparts, and we know how that constitution… has been
used to oppress Irishwomen (Butler Cullingford, E; 1990, p. 16).
The representation of the country as a submissive female figure for the purposes
of colonial domination did not disappear on the gaining of independence. If
anything the masculinist paradigm was reinforced. The suppression of female
4identity was continued by a new set of patriarchal colonisers in the form of the
new ruling ex-revolutionary elite.
The political elite of post-independence Ireland wanted to create a society
which was traditional, irredentist and patriarchal. These values became part of
public policy through legislative initiatives and in no small part through the
official symbolic recognition granted to them in the founding document of the new
polity, the Irish Constitution of 1937. The framers of the Constitution wanted to
create a legal framework document for a new Ireland, new in name only, for the
patriarchal and traditionalist values of colonial times were to remain. The primary
author of the constitutional text, Eamon de Valera, conceived of a utopian nation
of the masculine imaginary where cheerful maids and athletic youths danced at
crossroads in the half-light.
De Valera's attitude towards the role of women in the public sphere was
evident even during the revolutionary struggle. During the Easter Rising of 1916
de Valera had turned women volunteers away from his command post at
Boland's Bakery. Coogan (1995, p.67), describes the situation thus: ‘He had told
Cuman na mBan, the women's Volunteer force, that he would require them not
as combatants but as first aid workers and cooks - because, he said, he had no
weapons for them. In view of his subsequent attitude to women in public life it
is equally likely that he literally did not want to see them in the front line’.
Nowhere is de Valera's particular view of the role of women in Irish society
more evident than in the constitutional text itself.
The patriarchal model, evident in the Constitution's provisions in relation
to women was by no means accepted wholeheartedly by the majority of Irish
society. The Constitution itself was only narrowly passed by 685,105 votes in
favour to 526,945 against. 31 per cent of those who had the vote abstained from
voting in the referendum on the Constitution. Foremost amongst those who
opposed the passing of the Constitution were many of those women who had
been prominent in the nationalist struggle. Thus, groups such as the National
Council of Women of Ireland, the Womens' Graduates Association and the Joint
Committee of Women’s' Societies and Social Workers vented their disapproval
of the way in which the role of woman as mother was to be glorified in the
Constitution. Dorothy Macardle, an ardent and respected republican summed up
the frustration of many republican women towards the new Constitution in a
private correspondence to de Valera in May 1937:
The language of certain clauses suggests that the state may interfere to a great extent
in determining what opportunities shall be open or closed to women, there is no clause
whatever to counterbalance that suggestion or to safeguard women's rights in that respect... As
the Constitution stands, I do not see how anyone holding advanced views on the rights of
women can support it, and that is a tragic dilemma for those who have been loyal and ardent
workers in the national cause (Coogan, T.P; 1995, p.497).
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One notable and perhaps significant absentee from criticism of the
Constitution was Cumann na mBan, the republican women's movement. Cumann
na mBan decided to remain aloof from the debate on the Constitution as they
demanded a thirty-two county republic and did not recognize the Irish Free State.
As Ward (1989, p.244), has put it:
as orthodox Republicans first and foremost, they wanted a Constitution of the
Republic, and that constitution was not the one formulated by de Valera. The
Republic had still not been declared, partition continued, and the new state was
to be named ‘Eire’.... For Cumann na mBan to have entered into the debate
concerning [the Constitution's] impact on women would have entailed, in their
eyes, a compromise with their status as a Republican women's organisation.
Yet despite the opposition from women's groups de Valera remained steadfast in
his views on the constitutional position of women. Despite claims to equality of
all citizens in general terms, ‘woman’ was singled out for special attention in the
Constitution. Thus in Article 41 entitled The Family, it is provided that:
1. 1 The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit
group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and
imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.
2. The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and
authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the
welfare of the Nation and the State.
2. 1 In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman
gives to the state a support without which the common good cannot be achieved.
3.  The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be
obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties
in the home.
Not content with the patriarchal subtext in Irish society of the time, the framer of
the Constitution had to inscribe the role perceived by patriarchy for women into
the constitutional text. Thus the cultural notion of woman as (m)other informs the
way in which woman is to be perceived in constitutional discourse. The language
used favours the conception of the patriarchal family. Eamon de Valera, during the
parliamentary debates on the Constitution, referred specifically to criticism of the
way in which women were portrayed in the Constitution. He claimed ‘There is no
distinction made in this Constitution, in regard to political rights, between men and
women. I took out that phrase ‘without distinction of sex’ [which appeared in the
Constitution of 1922] because it had no meaning in the context of the Constitution,
and in the general atmosphere... as far as women's rights politically are concerned’
(67 Dail Debates 64, 11 May 1937). He went on to argue in relation to the
symbolic representation of women in constitutional discourse:
This Constitution has been attacked on the ground that it is taking away
women's rights. What it is doing where women are concerned is that, where
their rights are, they are equal. Therefore, where they are referred to here, they
are referred to by way of protection and the protection which the State is bound
6to give... [W]e ought to try [to] prevent the economic system from driving
women into avocations unsuited to their sex or strength or age (67 Dail
Debates 64, 11 May 1937).
It is clear then that the intention of the framer of the Constitution in this regard was
paternalistic. He was of the view that there were certain roles to which women
were suited and others to which they were not suited. This leads one to conclude
that these roles were in the main in the private sphere and connected to biological
function as well as the traditional or stereotypical roles which women were forced
to fill in the public sphere. That such a blatant form of gender differentiation was
couched in the language of protecting women from economic reality made it even
more calculated and invidious.
The country of de Valera's imaginary is no place for real women, only for
the iconic female Hibernia of masculinist nationalist myth. Only the image gains
respect. Woman, this dispensable cipher becomes, in constitutional discourse,
indispensable to the welfare of the state, ‘the common good’.
The constitutional text refers to ‘woman’ as if referring to an inert mass,
without soul, or character. The association of woman with reproductive function is
clear in the way in which the words ‘woman’ and ‘mother’ are used
interchangeably in Article 41.2. (M)others shall not be obliged to labour outside
the home but are laden with duties within the home. The words ‘State’, ‘Family’
and ‘Nation’ are all capitalized as all three are synonymous with patriarchy, the
dominant discourse. Woman is secondary an object living in the interstices of
masculine legal discourse. As MacKinnon (1987, p.55), has noted:
We notice in language as well as in life that the male occupies both the neutral
and the male position. This is another way of saying that the neutrality of
objectivity and of maleness are coextensive linguistically, whereas women
occupy the marked, the gendered, the different, the forever-female position.
Another expression of the sex specificity of objectivity socially is that women
have been nature. That is, men have been knowers, mind; women have been
‘to be known’, matter, that which is to be controlled and subdued, the acted
upon.
4. FOETAL CITIZENSHIP
The politics of foetal citizenship is born of an anxiety, bordering on hysteria, on
the part of traditionalist groups in relation to the fracturing of a monotheistic
Irish State. This is a politics of sexual morality which values the yet to come
over the here and now, purgation over pleasure, the transcendent over the
material. This totalitarian politics of Life is premised on the policing of
women’s desire, which in such a discourse, is an unstable and chaotic element
which disrupts their disciplinary politics. This politics of Life requires that the
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foetus is represented as a viable proto-citizen deserving of legal protection and
rights, and as one to whom duties are owed. In a discourse where citizenship is
premised on denial and self-sacrifice for some transcendent cause the
construction of woman as mother plays a vital symbolic and productive role.
Woman as vessel for the reproduction of the race is intimately linked with the
nationalist ideology on which the state was founded. The foetus and the nation
were homologised into a figure faced with death from a threatening force, in this
case the self-determining woman. For pro-life groups this politics of foetal life
acts as a means of suturing together a nation which for them no longer has a
unifying ideology. The foetus in this discourse becomes the objet petit a, that
which will suture together Ireland’s fragmented self. As Lauren Berlant has
written of the politics of foetal personhood:
Because it appears to be personhood in its natural completeness, prior to the
fractures of history and identity, the fetus is supposed to be a solution, from the
origin of human existence, to the corporeal, juridical, intimate violence that
plagues [society] today. (Berlant, L; 1997, p. 104).
In 1983, certain traditionalist pressure groups in Irish society fearing a liberal turn
in Supreme Court thinking on abortion sought to introduce an amendment to the
Constitution which disregarded any claim of Irish women to reproductive
autonomy. The proposed amendment to the Constitution on the abortion issue
guaranteed a right to life to the unborn. It read as follows:
the State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to
the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far
as practicable, to vindicate that right.
This acknowledged in law that the ideal Irish legal citizen was indeed virtual,
living for the future but never in the present. The fully realised female citizen was
deprived of agency so that the foetus incapable of agency was given the symbolic
status of honorary agent to come. 
If the foetus is recognised as being capable of having rights, in this case a
right to life, it has no concomitant obligations, while the fully realised citizen
carries the obligations. This creates a literally and symbolically split subject, one
subject in two bodies. This strange relationship or duty to the other becomes
particularly problematic when the other is not yet born, reducing the life of the
mother to that of the not yet dead rather than a fully valued living citizen. This
strange reinterpretation of the notion of rights discourse creates a case of
subjectivity as purgatory. As Lealle Ruhl has pointed out:
On what grounds could one possibly argue that the fetus is an individual with rights?
In liberal theory, rights are irretrievably tied to obligations; an individual gains
certain rights and with them corresponding obligations. But how can the foetus have
obligations? Indeed, what we witness in this description of pregnancy is not two
liberal subjects in one body, but rather one liberal subject in two bodies. The
8pregnant woman has all of the obligations of a ‘normal’ or typical liberal subject but
none of the rights. The fetus, on the other hand, has all of the rights of a typical
liberal subject but none of the obligations. A strange situation indeed (Ruhl, L; 2002,
p. 39).
The amendment was carried in a referendum in 1983. However, the amendment
was revealed to be of merely cosmetic effect, and did not alter the trend of Irish
women seeking abortions in England (Tomkin and Hanafin, 1995, p.183). The
most prudent response on the part of politicians would have been to avoid this
divisive referendum, to avoid the pressures exerted on them by pro-life groups.
The amendment was entirely unnecessary in legal terms as abortion was already
outlawed by statute in the form of sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the
Person Act 1861. The need to place the issue of abortion on the public agenda was
brought about by the actions of pro-life pressure groups in Irish society who feared
that the judiciary might somehow derive a right to pregnancy termination in a
manner similar to the United States Supreme Court in the case of Roe v Wade
(1973 410 US 113). It was also a reaction by these groups to a growing liberalism
in Irish society on social issues. The politicians who acceded to the requests of
these pressure groups to institute a referendum on the issue of the right to life of
the unborn acted rather naively, in trying to placate a section of Irish society which
appeared to wield more political clout than it actually possessed. As the political
scientist, Brian Girvin (1986, pp.70-1), has observed ‘the issue brought to light one
of the major failings of the Irish political system: that pressure can be brought to
bear on politicians during an election to make concessions to interest groups. [The
pro-life pressure groups were] well placed to maximize this pressure as three
elections took place between June 1981 and November 1982’. Thus, it was the
Constitution which was used to impose further burdens on women, something
which was entirely in keeping with the original intent of its framers in this regard.
The success of the pro-life lobby in this referendum in 1983 was founded on
constructing the foetus as a virtual citizen with rights. This legal fiction depended
for its success on constructing a notion of the foetus as a person and one who was
in potential danger of death. As Lauren Berlant has put it:
The success of the concept of foetal personhood depends on establishing a
mode of ‘representation’ that merges the word’s political and aesthetic
senses, imputing a voice, a consciousness, and a self-identity to the fetus
that can neither speak its name nor vote. This strategy of nondiegetic
voicing has two goals: (1) to establish the autonomy of the fetal individual;
and, paradoxically, (2) to show that the fetus is a contingent being,
dependent on the capacity of Americans to hear as citizens its cries as a
citizen for dignity of the body, its complaints at national injustice (Berlant,
L; 1997, p. 98).
In the case of Attorney-General v X and Others ([1992] 1 IR 1), the Irish Supreme
Court held that the constitutional prohibition on abortion contained in Article
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40.3.3. of the Constitution was not absolute. The case concerned a fourteen-year-
old pregnant rape victim, who had been prevented from travelling to England to
obtain a pregnancy termination. A permanent injunction to this effect was granted
by the High Court. The defendants appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held by a majority of four to one that Article 40.3.3 of the
Constitution permitted pregnancy termination, when it was established as a matter
of probability that there was a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother,
including the threat of suicide as was present in this case, if the termination were
not carried out. 
As a result of the case, the Government decided to hold referendums on the
issues of the right to life of the unborn,3 the right to travel4 and the right of access
to reproductive health information.5 The result of these referendums demonstrated
a perceptible shift in societal thinking on these issues. Thus, 62.4% of those who
voted in the referendum supported the right of the pregnant woman to travel and
59.9% supported the right to obtain information on pregnancy termination services
outside the jurisdiction. The proposed amendment regarding the right to life was
defeated with 65.4% voting against.
In the wake of these referendums the Government was forced to act on the
issue of access to reproductive health information. Legislation in the form of the
Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of
Pregnancies) Act 1995 was enacted. This piece of legislation allows individuals to
obtain information on pregnancy termination services outside the State within
strict limits. However, these reinterpretations of the Constitution in a manner less
damaging to women do not in reality lead to more justice for women. Thus, even
though abortion is lawful per se, in practice it is not possible to obtain one in
Ireland other than in the very limited circumstances where medical necessity
requires a termination in order to save the mother's life. This is due to the
interposition of the professional ethics of the medical profession and the
unwillingness of successive governments to introduce legislation allowing
pregnancy termination.
In 2002, a Bill was eventually introduced. However, this draft legislation
would have reversed the decision of the Supreme Court in the X case and
introduce even more draconian penal sanctions fore those who attempted to have
a pregnancy termination within the State. The Protection of Human Life in
Pregnancy Bill 2002 proposed to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in
the X case by excluding the threat of self-destruction as a ground for abortion.
Those who aided or abetted an abortion would in this draft legislation be
sentenced to up to 12 years imprisonment. The only grounds for abortion would
be where in the reasonable opinion of a medical practitioner; it was necessary to
prevent a real and substantial risk to the life of the woman. Thus, law expected
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women to pay the ultimate price, their life, if they were to evade the forced
burden of pregnancy. The human life of the Human Life in Pregnancy Bill that
appeared to be preferred was that of the foetus. Women, even in extreme cases,
were called on to give up something more, to endure forced pregnancy in the
name of some notion of idealised citizenship. Thus, the woman is sacrificed for
the virtual citizen within, itself a signifier of the life of the nation. As Berlant
puts it:
In so recasting the pregnant body as, at its best, a vehicle for the state’s
‘compelling interest’ in its citizens, the pro-life nation that currently exists
sanctions the pregnant woman… only insofar as she becomes impersonal and
public, committed to submitting her agency to the ‘compelling interests’ of any
number of higher powers (Berlant, L. 1997, p. 99).
The pro-life discourse, which is made up of diverse groupings, ranging from the
Roman Catholic hierarchy through the Taoiseach to the artist formerly known as
Dana, Ireland’s Eurovision Song Contest winner in 1970 and now luminary of
the political right, stress the role of woman as mother and the need to reproduce
the nation along traditional gender lines. This move falls within the tendency
found by Lauren Berlant in American society towards a pro-life model of
citizenship, which produces ironically a dead citizenship in its wake. As Berlant
puts it:
the normativity of pro-life society dictates that once pregnant the woman loses her
feminine gender, becoming primarily a mother … and therefore becomes uninteresting
in herself. In protecting the fetus from the woman they divide into a nongenital ‘female’
part –the maternal womb, which really belongs to the fetus- and a potentially
malevolent section, composed of a sexual body (un)governed by a woman’s
pseudosovereign consciousness (Berlant, L; 1997, p. 99).
For every privileged foetus there is a corresponding dead citizen, whose
individuality is consumed by a politics of life which values potential citizens
over the resistant body of the victim of male violence. This sacrificial figure can
only be valued as a victim either of male violence or as a scapegoat for the
moral majority which see her as that which threatens Life. Not only is male
violence somehow condoned in this discourse, but the woman must have a life
sentence imposed on her by being forced in the absence of legislation to the
contrary to carry the pregnancy to term.
This rememorative performance of a dead citizenship proceeds in the
rhetoric of contemporary politicians who while claiming to talk of improving the
lot of women in society simultaneously attempt to introduce legislation which
upholds a patriarchal nationalist view of societal organisation. As the Taoiseach
put it in a statement on the eve of the referendum:
We need to change our attitudes and our prejudices and offer support to families
of all shapes and sizes. Women must no longer be put in a position whereby their
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education, jobs and financial security might be threatened by pregnancy (Doyle
and Logue, 2002).
This speech by the primary sponsor of the proposed legal change was
disingenuous to say the least. In other words, he was saying what the framer of
the 1937 Constitution, Eamon De Valera had said in 1937, when he defended
the model of gender relations present in his nascent Constitution. De Valera too
spoke of a more egalitarian model of gender relations while at the same time
upholding a patriarchal view of society. Thus, for the current Taoiseach, a
woman can be a mother and work as well. There did not appear to be a choice.
She could either remain in the home and be a mother or have a career and an
education and be a mother. Her position in society still remained fixed to her
maternal role. This speech merely adds to rather than eliminates the patriarchally
assigned role of women in Article 41 of the Constitution.
The Taoiseach seems to be engaged in an unofficial amendment of Article
41, to the effect that the state shall now endeavour to ensure that mothers shall
not be obliged to engage in childcare to the neglect of their education and
careers.6 This reworking of Article 41 of the Constitution merely underlines the
residual importance of the family in Irish legal and political discourse. The
Taoiseach seems to think that women should be forced to carry unwanted
pregnancies to term but that such a little thing should not get in the way of their
careers.
Indeed the abortion issue was a prominent one in the recent referendum in
Ireland in 2002 on whether or not to acede to the Treaty of Nice. In the
referendum campaign pro-life activists joined forces in a call not to support the
Treaty with amongst others, Sinn Fein and the environmental movement. In this
regard we can see how the anti-abortion or foetal citizenship advocates form one
part of a wider movement against interfering with Irish sovereignty, or to be
more precise, a particularistic notion of Irishness, uncontaminated by outside
forces, a green island in both senses of the term (untainted by industrial
pollution and nationalist) as well as pure from a moral perspective (the stance of
the right to life lobby). It is then no surprise that these groups should join forces
against the European Other, who might want to dilute this traditionalist,
romanticsied, and masculinist notion of Irishness.
5. RE-MEMBERING DEAD MEN
The remains of dead heroes are regenerated and are reincorporated into the body
politic. We embrace these bones as virtual citizens. Dead patriots are perfect
citizens, as eminently manipulable for political purposes as they are silent. Silent
citizens who exude the sanctity of sacrifice. The cadaver is the ideal body of
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law, the zenith of quiescent regulability. These bodies as well as being carriers
of our originary traces, postulate our future as that which is not. Revealed as the
cadeveric grounds of legal personhood they must be endlessly resurrected so
that the fiction of the perpetual life of the nation is maintained. Hence the need
for the reburials, a constant reminder of eternal life which awaits those who live
for death. This ‘life strategy’ (Bauman, Z; 1992, pp. 24-31) combines the need
to maintain the state in perpetuity with the potential for immortality. As
Blanchot puts it: ‘In dying the hero does not die, he is born; he becomes
glorious, he accedes to presence and establishes himself in memory, a secular
survival… There is no death for the hero but only pomp and ceremony: a
superb, a supreme declaration, repose in visibility’ (Blanchot, M; 1993, p. 374).
In the wake of the deletion of the original Articles 2 and 3 from the
Constitution, which contained the State’s aspirational claim to the territory of
Northern Ireland, one might think it ironic that the Government should engage
in a politics of nationalist rememoration. However, this was a move precipitated
by the post-Belfast Agreement political reality as much as it was a form of
homage to dead founding fathers. It was an attempt to explicitly divorce
contemporary terrorism and Sinn Fein from the aims of the founders. Sinn Fein
in the post-Belfast Agreement period has become a potential political competitor
for Fianna Fail, tinged as it is with the nationalist politics which Fianna Fail has
always espoused. Thus, this move to capture these dead bodies for Fianna Fail’s
brand of cultural nationalism was another factor in the timing of this particular
resurrection. This is as much a question of the political manipulation of the dead
as of the manipulation of politics by the dead. It is not without relevance that
these funerals coincided with an upcoming general election. It also deflected
attention from a government party which had been associated with numerous
sleaze scandals. It was an excuse to rally national opinion around a common
cause. What better choice than the commemoration of a group of dead sons who
gave their lives for Ireland? The feel-good factor meets the traditional Irish
funeral fetish.7 Thus, in post-Belfast Agreement Ireland the resurrection and re-
membering of the past remains as important as ever in the service of obtaining
political capital.8
Performing, not wholly convincingly in the tradition of the nationalist
graveside oration, the Taoiseach returned to the past in order to reiterate the
foundational legitimacy of the State.9 The attempt to appeal to all shades of
nationalism can be seen in the Taoiseach’s justification of the violence of the
dead patriots of 1920 while simultaneously condemning contemporary militant
nationalist terrorism. The journalist and cultural commentator, Fintan O’Toole,
commenting on the decision to rebury the ten men, noted the Government’s
distancing of contemporary terrorism from the acts of the volunteers of 1919-
1921, a stance which sees ‘the only difference between a terrorist and a patriot
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[as being] the passage of time’ (O’Toole, F; 2001). This blurring of distinctions
in the institutional memory speaks to a wider amnesia in Irish society about its
founding violence. The terrorists of yesterday are now venerated by the state,
while the terrorists of today receive the State’s condemnation. The terrorists of
yesterday are the sacrificed the terrorists of today the sacrificer. As the
Taoiseach noted in his oration: ‘The Good Friday Agreement has moved us to a
new stage in our history, but that certainly does not mean we forget or repudiate
those who founded our State’. In this phrase the Taoiseach is mistaking
remembering for memorialising, which excludes a more complicated analysis of
the events leading to the state’s founding. This political rhetoric wants to appeal
to all constituencies, condoning the violence of the past and distancing itself
from today’s terrorists who have the same objective as these sacrificial heroes.
This is a case of blocking out the reality of past violence while using these dead
bodies as vehicles for current political purposes. As Katherine Verdery has
framed it:
any manipulation of a corpse directly enables one’s identification with it
through one’s own body, thereby tapping into one’s reservoirs of feeling…
such manipulations may mobilise pre-existing affect by evoking one’s own
personal losses or one’s identification with specific aspects of the dead
person’s biography. This possibility increases wherever national ideologies
emphasise ideas about suffering and victimhood…
Dead bodies… have properties that make them particularly effective
political symbols. They are thus excellent means for accumulating
something essential to political transformation: symbolic capital (Verdery,
K; 1999, p. 33).
The funeral of the tenth volunteer was held at his family’s request in his home
village of Ballylanders in County Limerick. The oration was delivered by the
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. In concluding his speech the
Minister recited the following lines from W.B. Yeat’s poem ‘Easter 1916’
(prefacing them with the assertion that ‘The story of Ireland’s struggle for
freedom and self-determination has often invoked images of pain and suffering,
self-sacrifice and great tragedy’.10):
Too long a sacrifice
Can make a stone of the heart
O when may it suffice?
That is Heaven’s part, our part
To murmur name upon name,
As a mother names her child
When sleep at last has come
On limbs that had run wild
It is appropriate that such lines should be chosen, but not for the reasons the
Minister’s speechwriters thought. This poem questions the very act of rebellion
itself and the poet’s role both before and after this event. It is a poem of
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indeterminacy, of questions unanswered and unanswerable. As David Lloyd has
noted, this poem is one of Yeat’s earliest reflections upon the obsessive rituals
of repetition by which nation states assure the legitimacy of their foundations
and maintain their equilibrium (Lloyd, D; 1993, pp. 69-70).11
It is ironically appropriate then that the Minister should choose it in
performing one of these equilibrium maintaining obsessive rituals of repetition.
This is an example of how Ireland, born out of a violent trauma based on a
philosophy of blood sacrifice, is a country blocked by its failure to mourn. It
looks to an imagined past peopled by dead patriots who live on in the official
memory of the state. They live a perpetual life consistent with both the teachings
of Roman Catholic dogma and the paganistic strain of hero-worship dating from
the mythical heroes of pre-Christian Ireland - Christ and Cuchulain fused in a
narrative of never-ending life. Indeed one could go so far as to state that such a
sacrificial proto-citizen is a model for political citizenship in the postcolonial
period. Indebted as the state is to such figures for its formation, its citizens must
engage in a form of citizenship, which pays constant tribute to these dead heroes
and in so doing participate in a living for death premised on the redemptive and
ascetic principles of sacrificial citizenship.
6. CONCLUSION
Postcolonial Ireland in its deathly foundations appears to accommodate more
easily the dead than the living excessive body of the citizen. This has been made
manifest in the past year, a year in which dead patriots are accorded the pomp
and ceremony of a second burial and further attempts are made to block a
woman’s right to choose. The proposed legislation would have led to a situation,
if passed, where the only act of self-determination a woman could perform in the
context of abortion would have been that of self-destruction, as the proposed
legislation prevented the threat of suicide as a legitimate ground for obtaining an
abortion. Death in the name of the national struggle is valorised as part of the
traditional narration of the nation. However, death in another guise the
‘sacrifice’ of the foetus for the mother as the pro-life lobby would have it is
unacceptable, as it acts as a threat to their fantasy of nationhood.
The dematerialization of the body which for the nationalists of the early
twentieth century and their claimed inheritors in the ranks of militant
nationalism was valorised as a means of political resistance becomes, in this
same ideology, problematic when given presence at the site of another body, e.g.
the dematerialization of the foetus. The valorisation of the deaths, suicidal or
otherwise of patriots does not extend to the bodies of women who may want to
give up the ‘life’, as the law has it, within them, so that they may exercise
autonomous choice. Neither may the threat of suicide be a legally acceptable
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pre-condition for an abortion, the necessity of which was precipitated by male
violence. Thus, the suicidal woman is seen as a threat to the vitalist or
regenerative ontology upon which the state is premised, an enemy of the state
rather than an officially sanctioned hero.
The corpse of the executed freedom fighter is valorised in nationalist
thought because it denotes the right kind of suffering for the right kind of cause.
Dying in order to put an end to individual suffering in the case of a pregnancy
resulting from rape is not valorised in traditionalist thought. Thus, the outcry by
traditionalist groups after the Supreme Court decision in Attorney-General v X.
In this discourse the pregnant rape victim is a mere vessel to be sacrificed on the
altar of Life. Woman here is that absolute non-identity which threatens the
paternal law of fictional fixed identity and is in turn contained within the
performative of further laws which attempt to contain her desire within the
fiction of marriage and the family.
Recent political events have revealed an Ireland which still identifies with
a notion of nationhood which entails the sacrifice of some for a transcendent
thing, this thing today being a familial nation based on reproductive economy,
an endlessly reproducing nation. The politics of foetal life and that of the politics
of dead heroes continue to cohabit comfortably in our postmodern polity. This
politics of natalist nationalism denies death so that the state may endlessly
reproduce itself. In order for this to happen sacrifices must be made. Dead
heroes live endlessly in the memory while living women who threaten suicide
are forgotten. We still refuse to listen to Juno’s injunction in Sean O’Casey’s
play Juno and the Paycock: ‘it’s nearly time we had a little less respect for the
dead, an’ a little more regard for the livin’ (O’Casey, S; 1949, p. 58).
Patrick Hanafin
Jean Monnet Fellow, Department of Law, European University Institute,
Florence, and Senior Lecturer, Birkbeck Law School, University of London.
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ENDNOTES
1 Colm Toibin (1999, p. xxi) has noted the recurrent trope of men killing women in Irish
fiction. As for fiction so also with the law. Women killed by men over and over again in
fiction were also killed symbolically in the language of the law.
2 This is a rather visceral example of Lacan’s formulation: ‘I love you, but, because
inexplicably I love in you something more than you – the objet petit a – I mutilate you’
(Lacan, J; 1978, p. 263).
3 The proposed amendment on this issue was worded as follows:
It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless such
termination is necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of the
mother where there is an illness or disorder of the mother giving rise to a
real and substantial risk to her life, not being a risk of self-destruction.
4 This proposal was worded as follows:
Subsection 3 of this subsection [Article 40.3.3] shall not limit freedom to
travel between the State and another state.
5 The proposed amendment on this issue was worded as follows:
Subsection 3 of this section shall not limit freedom to obtain or make
available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by
law, information relating to services lawfully available in another state.
6 As Conor Gearty has noted: ‘What is the point of elected representatives if their job is to
obey blindly the demands of the electorate in a referendum campaign carried on as vacuously
and as misleadingly as this one?’ (Gearty, C; 2002).
7 What Bataille might call: ‘a gay reaction in the face of the work of death’ (Bataille, G; 1990,
p. 24).
8 A fact noted in 1898 by Edward Webb, who, in commenting on the commemoration fever
induced by the centenary of another unsuccessful rebellion, that of 1798, wrote: ‘The country
appears memorial mad… What is going on is talk about the past, and inaction regarding the
present’ (Cited by Foster, R; 2001, p. 219).
9 In his oration the Taoiseach notes:
‘It is no wonder to the people of Ireland then that this day has come. Although we
have difficulties of our own time, there is no fair person in this country but thinks
that it is good that we bury these men with State honours here today, and indeed
that it is time that we did so.
The Irish State today is discharging a debt of honour that stretches back 80 years.
Here in Glasnevin stand the memorials to Irish patriots of the past two centuries,
statesmen, soldiers, all those who contributed to the onward march of a nation’
(The Irish Times, Monday October 15, 2001,
<www.ireland.com/newspaper/ireland/2001/1015/hom99.htm>.
10 Oration at the graveside of Volunteer Patrick Maher by Mr. John O’Donoghue, T.D.,
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, on 20 October 2001,
<http://www.justice.ie/802569B20047F907/vWeb/pcSBHN574N66>.
11 Lloyd goes on to state that:
‘The paradox of ‘Easter 1916’ is that the achievement of such politically symbolic
status, the transformation of lout or clown into martyr that brings about the
foundation of the nation, is seen not to produce reconciliation but troubled
tension. The tension subsists metaphorically between the symbolic ‘stone’ and the
continuing ‘living stream’ that it troubles; the question posed is the relation
between the singular moment in which a nation is founded or constituted and the
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future history of the citizens it brings into being. Yeats represents the relationship
as simultaneously one of trouble and of anxious, obsessive rememoration. For
though the stone, like any symbol, continues to reside ‘in the midst of all’, its
finality as gravestone on which the names of the national martyrs are inscribed
would appear to be at odds with the opening of a future history which its function
as foundation-stone implies. Its double status obliges a continual recurrence to and
questioning of the moment of foundation it represents, with the result that the
formerly unificatory function of the symbol is irrevocably ruptured’ (Lloyd, D;
1993 pp. 71-72).
